This installment corresponds to 2026-11-03, Beijing time. Research cutoff: 2026-11-02, 20:04:17 UTC. Financial anchors are FY2025 full-year results and the latest FY2026 disclosures available by the cutoff. Rolls-Royce's latest complete segment financial results are H1, not Q3. Amounts retain their original currencies and are not added across currencies. This is a research record, not investment advice.
1. Core judgment in one sentence
Strong maintenance demand does not guarantee a broad-based profit increase: control of parts, effective capacity and contractual risk explain divergence better than new-engine delivery volumes alone.
The falsifiable question is not whether engines matter over the long term, but who captures demand, under which contract, and when it becomes cash. Disclosures support the importance of aftermarket activities, not the proposition that every maintenance company's margin rises together. If comparable maintenance margins improve broadly and persistently as parts and delivery constraints recede, this report's emphasis on profit divergence should be reduced.[E01][E06][E08][E10]
2. Industry boundaries and corrections
2.1 Scope and exclusions
The scope covers civil turbofan development and certification, critical castings and forgings and hot-section parts, engine manufacturing, spare parts, maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO), long-term service agreements and spare-engine leasing. Large passenger aircraft propulsion and its aftermarket are the focus. Company segments may nevertheless include business aviation, regional aircraft, military activities or industrial gas turbines.
This does not repeat Day07 commercial satellite launch, nor add power-generation turbines, entire aircraft values, airline revenues, airframe maintenance or all military engines to the civil-engine market. Howmet Engine Products and Pratt & Whitney are mixed-business samples. MTU commercial MRO also includes leasing, asset management and industrial-gas-turbine-related activities: its margin is not a pure repair-labor margin.[E07][E09][E10]
2.2 Align definitions before explaining profits
- Engine deliveries are not aircraft deliveries: spares, installation requirements and recognition timing affect the relationship.
- Services revenue is not repair-labor revenue: OEM parts, repairs, overhauls and long-term contract recognition are often combined.
- Contract revenue is not current-period cash: flight-hour receipts, prepayments, maintenance expenses and estimate revisions may occur at different times.
- Reported profit is not adjusted profit: adjustments can reverse the direction of year-on-year comparisons; selecting only the attractive measure is misleading.
- Joint-venture ownership is not aftermarket revenue share: CFM is a 50/50 GE–Safran venture, but different entities supply aftermarket parts and maintenance. One LEAP engine cannot be counted twice in the partners' deliveries.[E02][E10][E14][E15]
Conflict record [conflict E01-vs-E02]: GE moved Aeroderivative from CES to DPT in FY2026. Original FY2025 disclosures and restated FY2026 comparisons have different boundaries. This is a perimeter change, not fabricated operating data. This report does not calculate new quarterly growth against the old annual base.
2.3 Separate realized outcomes from forward-looking information
This table distinguishes achievements from targets. Its entries cannot be summed to estimate market size.
| Subject | Disclosed actual | Forward-looking information and release date | Interpretation limit |
|---|---|---|---|
| CFM LEAP | FY2025 deliveries of 1,802, +28% [E01]; first 9 months of FY2026: 1,565, +26% [E04] | Safran maintained high-teens FY2026 delivery-growth guidance on 2026-10-23 [E04] | Do not convert a qualitative growth range into an undisclosed precise delivery count |
| Rolls-Royce civil OE | FY2025 deliveries of 483 [E05] | FY2026 guidance of 550–600 maintained on 2026-07-30 [E06] | Includes large and business/regional engines; guidance is not annual actual |
| Annual LEAP shop visits | IATA/Emerton research estimate of approximately 600–800 for 2025 [E11] | Forecast of more than 5,000 in 2040, published 2026-06-24 [E11] | The baseline is an estimate and the endpoint a forecast, neither an audited actual measured by this report |
3. Verdicts on four falsifiable hypotheses
H1: A strong engine aftermarket raises margins across all maintenance-related businesses
Verdict: the strong version fails. In the first 9 months of FY2026, MTU commercial MRO revenue rose 19% and adjusted EBIT rose 15%, but the margin fell from 8.3% to 8.0%. Absolute profit growth and margin contraction can coexist. This counterexample rejects universal margin expansion; it does not establish an industry average.[E08]
Evidence and counterexample: GE's services revenue mix and Rolls-Royce civil profitability demonstrate aftermarket importance. MTU demonstrates that mix, ramp-up costs and purchased materials also matter.[E01][E06][E08]
Conflict treatment: OEM services and independent maintenance have different boundaries. Cross-company margin differences alone do not prove causality.
Falsification test: Hold company and segment definitions constant and track revenue, comparable EBIT/operating margins and cash conversion through the next year. If growing maintenance businesses broadly and persistently expand margins without ramp-up costs offsetting demand, revise the persistence-of-divergence thesis.
Confidence: high for rejecting the universal claim; medium for future divergence. Exact company figures remain single-source, with medium confidence.
H2: New maintenance facilities and additional slots alone remove engine bottlenecks
Verdict: evidence does not support sufficiency; complementary conditions appear necessary. IATA/Emerton identifies parts, spare engines, repair capacity and aftermarket access together. Jinwan in China has actual redelivery achievements; Gulf expansion still relies on OEM technical and training support. Floor area alone is not enough.[E11][E17][E18]
Key evidence: GE's proposed acquisition of precision-casting supplier CPP signals capital allocation toward upstream critical capacity. The transaction is not yet complete and does not prove supply has increased.[E03]
Conflict treatment: Investment announcements demonstrate supply intentions, while airline groundings demonstrate customer pressure. Both can be true. No uniform turnaround-time series is available, so no global capacity-shortfall percentage is calculated.
Falsification test: Track redeliveries, qualified-parts availability, turnaround and customer groundings at operational facilities. If additional slots consistently shorten turnaround without improved parts conditions, reduce the priority assigned here to parts constraints.
Confidence: medium. Multiple source types support coexisting bottlenecks, but independent, standardized regional measurements are missing.
H3: Improved reliability necessarily reduces profits throughout the aftermarket chain
Verdict: direction depends on contract structure; no aggregate conclusion is accepted yet. Fewer visits may reduce work for time-and-materials or per-event repair providers. Under flight-hour contracts carrying maintenance obligations, better reliability can instead lower costs and increase flying hours. These models cannot be put into one linear forecast.[E06][E15][E24]
Evidence and counterexample: Rolls-Royce reports contractual margin improvements. CFM durability certification and deployment show technical progress, but product targets and test results do not demonstrate equivalent life improvements throughout the mature global fleet.[E06][E24]
Conflict treatment: More maintenance can represent either revenue opportunity or OEM warranty liability. Visit counts alone do not identify the winners.
Falsification test: Compare time on wing, unscheduled removals, contract costs and receipts before and after upgrades under comparable operating conditions. If these metrics do not improve, reject realized technical improvement. A stronger aggregate thesis requires evidence of profits moving together across contract types.
Confidence: medium for the mechanism; no verdict on total industry net-profit change.
H4: Open aftermarket access transfers all profits from OEMs to independent maintenance providers
Verdict: access creates opportunity, but complete migration is unsupported. The IATA–CFM extension supports competitive maintenance choice. Ryanair plans its own facilities while committing to buy CFM engine materials, showing that a change in repair execution can coexist with retained OEM parts revenue.[E16][E22]
Key evidence: Rights, parts supply, customer acceptance, certification capabilities and economics must all align. Agreement provisions are not realized market-share gains.
Conflict record [conflict E11-vs-E22]: IATA's MRO article dated 2026-06-24 dates the agreement to 2018, while its renewal release dated 2026-01-20 says the original agreement was reached in 2019. The initial signing year remains unresolved. This report uses only the 2026 extension and does not state either earlier year as settled fact.
Falsification test: Track actual independent share, approved alternative-parts use, turnaround and OEM spare-parts revenue. Strengthen the migration thesis only if independent share rises while OEM aftermarket revenue is materially displaced. More repair shops still buying OEM materials indicate a reorganization of activities, not a wholesale transfer of value.
Confidence: medium. Contract arrangements come from the parties involved; full-market share data and independent corroboration are insufficient.
4. Asset one: profit map
4.1 From assets and contracts to profits, not a revenue pie relabeled as profit
The table identifies charging mechanisms and risks. Its ordering is an analytical framework, not measured global profit shares.
| Activity | Monetizable asset | Revenue mechanism | Main risks and checks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical castings and hot-section parts | Processes, quality consistency, qualified capacity | OEM and aftermarket parts demand | Yield, lead times and customer concentration; expansion is not qualified output [E03][E09] |
| OEM and program interests | Designs, certifications, installed base and technical data | New engines, spares, long-term agreements | New-engine mix, durability obligations, contract estimates and customer credit [E01][E06][E10] |
| MRO execution | Technicians, tooling, testing, authorizations and slots | Overhauls, component repair and engineering | Materials costs, turnaround, ramp-up and working capital [E08][E11] |
| Spare engines and asset management | Immediately usable engines | Rent, allocation and residual value | Capital costs, useful life and future supply/demand; no standardized profit pool [E07][E12] |
| Airlines | Routes, customers and scheduling | Revenue from usable capacity | Groundings, substitute leasing and late delivery; supply-chain costs are not upstream profits [E12][E18] |
4.2 Quantifiable company samples, not total industry profits
FY2025 provides full-year anchors; the latest available FY2026 segment disclosures indicate direction. Missing comparable pure-business data remain missing rather than estimated.
| Sample and period | Revenue | Gross profit | Operating profit or specified measure | Margin and limitations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GE CES FY2025, original disclosure | USD 33,314 million | Comparable gross profit not separately disclosed | Segment profit USD 8,861 million | 26.6%; services USD 25,010 million, approximately 75%; old segment perimeter [E01] |
| GE CES FY2026 Q3, new perimeter | USD 10,342 million | Not separately disclosed | Approximately USD 2.9 billion in release | Margin down 10 basis points year on year; no precise margin recalculated from rounded profit [E02] |
| Rolls-Royce Civil FY2025 | GBP 10,382 million | Underlying gross profit GBP 2,675 million | Underlying operating profit GBP 2,130 million | 20.5%; underlying measure, not a direct GAAP ranking [E05] |
| Rolls-Royce Civil FY2026 H1 | GBP 6,186 million | Underlying gross profit GBP 1,857 million | Underlying operating profit GBP 1,567 million | 25.3%; net contractual and operational improvements contributed GBP 497 million, not all current maintenance cash [E06] |
| MTU commercial MRO FY2025 | Approximately EUR 6.0 billion | Not separately disclosed | Adjusted EBIT EUR 478 million | 8.0%, versus 8.7% in FY2024; mixed activities [E07] |
| MTU commercial MRO first 9 months FY2026 | EUR 5,108 million | Not separately disclosed | Adjusted EBIT EUR 408 million | 8.0%, versus 8.3%; not an OEM spare-parts margin [E08] |
| Howmet Engine Products FY2026 Q3 | USD 1,451 million | Not used | Adjusted EBITDA USD 567 million | 39.1%; includes military and industrial gas turbines; EBITDA excludes depreciation and amortization [E09] |
| Pratt & Whitney FY2026 Q3 | USD 9,231 million | Not used | Reported operating profit USD 608 million; adjusted USD 968 million | 6.6% and 10.5%; includes military and Canada activities [E10] |
Invalid addition: Intra-chain transactions, joint-program interests, currencies and overlapping periods prevent adding these profits into a global engine profit pool. Complete separate new-engine and aftermarket gross margins are unavailable, so no unsupported aftermarket share of profits is claimed.
Essential counterexample: P&W commercial aftermarket grew 21%, while reported operating profit fell 19%; adjusted profit rose 29%. A USD 363 million customer-bankruptcy charge (USD 3.63 hundred million) and approximately USD 160 million of IEEPA recoveries affected the relevant measures. Demand, credit events, accounting adjustments and cash require separate explanations.[E10]
5. Asset two: ranking bottleneck urgency
5.1 Global priorities
These are evidence-informed relative priorities, not engineering estimates of a common shortfall rate.
| Priority | Bottleneck | Why it matters | Evidence of relief |
|---|---|---|---|
| First | Qualified critical parts, repair solutions and traceable materials | Idle facilities may be waiting for parts; safety standards cannot be lowered to bypass constraints [E11][E19] | Shorter parts waits within the same type, fewer reworks |
| Next | Effective maintenance throughput and spare engines | Slots require matching staff, tools and testing [E17][E18][E25] | More completions alongside shorter turnaround and fewer groundings |
| Then | Durability and unscheduled removals | Unexpected visits displace planned maintenance [E11][E24] | Better time on wing under comparable conditions |
| Persistent | New-engine ramp-up competing with aftermarket resources | Higher new-engine deliveries do not guarantee timely parts for existing fleets [E02][E04][E23] | Both improve instead of crowding each other out |
| Long term | Contracts, access and talent | Capital investment can outpace qualification and accumulated experience [E16][E21][E22] | Approved new capabilities delivering commercially and consistently |
5.2 Regional differences
| Region | Priority | Available evidence | Unsupported inference |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | Critical castings and in-service maintenance expansion | Proposed CPP acquisition and Pratt US investments [E03][E25] | Investment spending equals this year's incremental output |
| Europe | OEM parts, independent repair and airline self-maintenance | Latest MTU margins and Ryanair materials agreement [E08][E16] | Self-maintenance necessarily avoids OEM charges |
| China | Operational authorized maintenance and ramp-up | Jinwan announced its 100th PW1100G-JM redelivery on 2026-09-21 [E17] | Local maintenance equals domestic core-engine technology or all-local parts |
| Gulf | Large-fleet maintenance and piece-part repair | Emirates disclosed GE technical/training support and USD 300 million expansion on 2026-05-14 [E18] | All investment has become usable capacity |
Regional data cannot support a standardized shortage league table. These are operational priorities, not national competitiveness scores.
6. Asset three: timing of profit migration
6.1 FY2023 to FY2026: the observable part of profit migration
Without a uniform history of pure industry profits, the historical CES series in GE's FY2025 annual report provides a consistent observation—not a measure of industry-wide migration. It includes activities subsequently moved out and cannot be directly spliced to the new FY2026 perimeter.[E01][E02]
| Historical phase | Disclosed actuals on consistent definitions | Interpretation and boundary |
|---|---|---|
| FY2023 | CES services revenue USD 17,686 million; segment profit USD 5,643 million; margin 23.7% | Observation baseline, not global profit share [E01] |
| FY2024 | CES services revenue USD 19,775 million; segment profit USD 7,055 million; margin 26.2% | Services and segment profit both increased, but not all incremental profit can be attributed to services [E01] |
| FY2025 | CES services revenue USD 25,010 million; segment profit USD 8,861 million; margin 26.6% | Growth continued while MTU MRO margin fell to 8.0%: divergence, not synchronized improvement [E01][E07] |
| Latest FY2026 disclosures | MTU first 9 months MRO margin remained 8.0%; P&W Q3 reported and adjusted profits moved in different directions | Focus shifts from demand recovery to effective throughput, mix and contract risk; a cross-sample interpretation, not measured industry profit-share migration [E08][E10] |
6.2 From current observations to realized investment
| Phase | Known outcome or scenario | Potential profit location | Required trigger |
|---|---|---|---|
| As of 2026-11-02 and the subsequent near term | Actual new-engine and aftermarket demand coexist with profit divergence [E02][E08][E10] | Qualified parts, operational repair capacity and spare assets | Redeliveries, materials availability and cash, not orders alone |
| Capacity ramp-up | US, Chinese and Gulf investments and capabilities follow different schedules [E17][E18][E25] | Costs and capital employed rise first; throughput may follow | Qualifications, people, actual output and turnaround; groundbreaking is not commissioning |
| 2027 onward | CPP expected to close in FY2027 H2, subject to conditions and approvals [E03] | Upstream integration may change supply security and bargaining | Closing, subsequent capacity and external-customer supply arrangements |
| 2029 onward | Ryanair facilities are planned, not operational [E16] | Repair execution shifts to the airline while OEM materials revenue may remain | Completion, certification, actual repair volumes and full costs |
| Longer term | IATA/Emerton's 2040 visits forecast is conditional [E11] | Installed-base aging increases repairs, while technology can change frequency | Time on wing, retirements, fleet growth and maintenance organization |
6.3 The sequence most easily misread
More orders do not equal more qualified parts. More parts do not automatically shorten turnaround. Shorter turnaround does not guarantee higher margins for every supplier. Reduced groundings can benefit airlines, while lower visit frequency can reduce work for per-event repair providers. Track profit migration by contract, not by the aftermarket label.
7. Asset four: counterfactuals and three stress tests
All scenarios below are researcher-defined counterfactuals, not industry forecasts. No unsupported volume, cost or profit-sensitivity coefficients are introduced.
Stress test one: flying demand falls, but maintenance obligations do not fall proportionally
Transmission: Fewer flight hours → reduced hourly charges → slower long-term-contract receipts → committed maintenance and fixed costs persist → cash pressure can precede accounting-profit pressure.
Offsets: Planned maintenance can be deferred; retirements can release used serviceable material and spare engines, relieving parts and leasing tightness. Offsetting effects across fleets and contracts are uncertain.[E06][E12][E13]
Checks and rejection conditions: Monitor flying hours, contract cash, actual shop visits and groundings. If receipts, turnaround and contract profitability remain stable despite lower demand, other factors absorbed the shock; do not mechanically infer lower profits.
Stress test two: durability improves faster than expected
Transmission: Approved upgrades enter fleets faster → longer time on wing under comparable conditions → fewer unscheduled removals → reduced queues and spare-engine demand → pressure on per-event maintenance and leasing scarcity premiums, but potential gains for contracts carrying maintenance costs.[E06][E24]
Offsets: Fleet growth and continued older-aircraft operations may replace lost visits. Certification is not fleet-wide retrofit completion.
Checks and rejection conditions: Observe upgrade penetration and operational results, not vendor life targets as realized outcomes. If unscheduled removals do not decline or shop backlogs continue rising, reject rapid bottleneck removal.
Stress test three: new engines and repairs compete for critical parts while customer credit losses emerge
Transmission: Competing demand for castings and technicians → longer parts waits and turnaround → higher airline leasing and compensation pressure → increased OEM costs, working capital and credit risk → service revenue can grow while reported profit falls.[E03][E10][E11]
Offsets: Serviceable alternatives, approved repairs, vertical integration or customer prepayments can buffer, but not necessarily eliminate, pressure.
Checks and rejection conditions: Track deliveries, bad debts, inventories, contract liabilities and operating cash, not adjusted profit alone. If both production and repair throughput rise while credit losses and groundings fall, reduce scarcity risk. Proposed safety rules are risk signals, not already effective obligations.[E20]
8. Asset five: evidence gaps and unresolved questions
- Global profit pool: No deduplicated, same-currency, same-period total for pure civil-engine profits; activity-level profit shares cannot be calculated.
- Aftermarket gross profit: Most samples mix new engines, parts and services. Services revenue share is not services profit share.
- Effective capacity: Nominal slots, redeliveries, repair depth and turnaround lack consistent definitions. Investment announcements cannot be assembled into a global shortfall percentage.
- Independent verification: Financial releases and presentations from the same company are one source. IATA and commissioned research do not constitute independent surveys. Exact company figures receive medium confidence under the single-source convention.
- Forecast risk: Rolls-Royce and Safran FY2026 figures are company guidance; IATA/Emerton is an industry forecast. Maintenance growth depends on flying, reliability and retirements. Historical peak groundings are not today's count.
- Perimeter risk: GE restatements, Pratt's mixed civil/military activities, Howmet industrial turbines and EBITDA, and MTU leasing/asset management distort simple rankings.
- Source conflict: The IATA agreement's initial signing year remains unresolved rather than guessed. It does not alter the 2026-extension conclusion.[E11][E22]
- Freshness risk: Early trade-media outlooks support mechanisms, not substitutes for current company results. Oliver Wyman's page contains later scenario updates without a precise update date; its version-dependent numerical market forecasts are not used.[E13][E21]
The key observation is whether new repair capacity, supported by parts, people and certification, shortens actual turnaround—and whose contractual cash improves when it does. Buildings, orders and enthusiasm alone cannot identify profit capture.
9. Evidence ledger
Entries are numerically ordered. Actual financials may still use company-defined adjusted measures. Medium confidence does not imply unreliable figures: it reflects the absence of independent corroboration. Media repetition of the same release is not independent verification.
| ID | Data point/judgment | Value or conclusion | Time anchor | Source type | Source and link | Independent second source? | Confidence | Conflict flag |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| E01 | GE CES annual and LEAP actuals | FY2023 services USD 17,686m, profit USD 5,643m, 23.7%; FY2024 services USD 19,775m, profit USD 7,055m, 26.2%; FY2025 revenue USD 33,314m, services USD 25,010m/approximately 75%, profit USD 8,861m/26.6%; LEAP 1,802/+28% | FY2023–FY2025; FY2025 results 2026-01-22 | Primary financial | GE FY2025 annual report; results | No, same-company corroboration; single source | Medium | Yes: perimeter change versus E02 |
| E02 | Latest GE CES actuals and perimeter | Q3 revenue USD 10,342m, services USD 7,735m; profit approximately USD 2.9bn, margin -10bp year on year; Aeroderivative moved out | FY2026 Q3; 2026-10-20 | Primary financial | GE 10-Q; quarterly results | No, same source | Medium | Yes: perimeter change versus E01 |
| E03 | CPP acquisition plan | USD 11.75bn; expected FY2027 H2 closing, subject to approvals; not realized capacity | 2026-09-08 | Primary company | GE CPP announcement | No; single source | Medium | None |
| E04 | LEAP actuals and guidance | Q3 535/+5%; first 9 months 1,565/+26%; FY2026 high-teens growth is guidance | 2026-10-23 | Primary financial | Safran Q3 | GE is a partner in the same program, not fully independent; single source | Medium | Do not add to GE |
| E05 | Rolls civil annual actuals | Revenue GBP 10,382m; gross profit GBP 2,675m; operating profit GBP 2,130m, 20.5%; OE 483 | FY2025; 2026-02-26 | Primary financial | Rolls FY2025 | No; single source | Medium | Underlying basis |
| E06 | Rolls civil H1 and guidance | Revenue GBP 6,186m, gross profit GBP 1,857m, operating profit GBP 1,567m, 25.3%; net contractual and operational improvements GBP 497m; FY2026 OE 550–600 guidance | FY2026 H1; 2026-07-30 | Primary financial | Rolls H1 | No; single source | Medium | Not Q3; guidance not actual |
| E07 | MTU MRO annual actuals | Revenue approximately EUR 6.0bn; adjusted EBIT EUR 478m, 8.0% versus FY2024 8.7%; not pure repair | FY2025; 2026-02-24 | Primary financial | MTU FY2025 | No; single source | Medium | None |
| E08 | Latest MTU MRO actuals | Revenue EUR 5,108m/+19%; adjusted EBIT EUR 408m/+15%; 8.0% versus 8.3% | First 9 months FY2026; 2026-10-29 | Primary financial | MTU 9M | No; single source | Medium | None |
| E09 | Howmet components sample | Engine Products revenue USD 1,451m; adjusted EBITDA USD 567m, 39.1%; includes military and industrial turbines | FY2026 Q3; 2026-10-29 | Primary financial | Howmet Q3 | No; single source | Medium | EBITDA is not operating profit |
| E10 | P&W operating counterexample | Revenue USD 9,231m; aftermarket +21%; reported profit USD 608m/-19%, 6.6%; adjusted USD 968m/+29%, 10.5%; customer charge USD 363m, IEEPA recoveries approximately USD 160m | FY2026 Q3; 2026-10-20 | Primary financial | RTX Q3; official presentation | No, same source | Medium | Reported/adjusted difference is not a contradiction |
| E11 | MRO constraints, history and forecast | GTF peak groundings in 2025-03: 648 aircraft/28%; LEAP 2025 estimate approximately 600–800 visits; 2040 forecast above 5,000 | Published 2026-06-24 | Industry research | IATA/Emerton | No independent equivalent survey; single source | Medium | Yes: original signing year conflicts with E22 |
| E12 | Airline supply-chain cost estimate | Above USD 11bn in 2025; neither audited actual nor upstream profits | Published 2025-10-13 | Industry research | IATA/Oliver Wyman | No; joint study treated as one source | Medium | Estimate, not actual |
| E13 | Aging fleet and MRO risks | Supply constraints, life extension and geopolitical scenarios affect maintenance; precise forecasts from multiple page versions not used | 2026 report; later update date unspecified | Industry research | Oliver Wyman | IATA corroborates mechanisms, not identical quantitative definitions | Medium | Update-date gap |
| E14 | CFM ownership | GE/Safran 50/50; joint-program deliveries cannot be double-counted | Page at research cutoff | Primary company | CFM About; Safran CFM | Parties agree; not independent | Medium | None |
| E15 | Joint venture and services recognition | Aftermarket revenue depends on parts, repair and overhaul actually supplied; not necessarily ownership share | Historical mechanism explanation; not current share | Primary company | GE investor explanation | No; historical percentages not carried forward | Medium | Historical material |
| E16 | Airline self-maintenance and materials | Ryanair plans facilities from 2029 and signed a materials-services memorandum of understanding with CFM | 2026-02-10; future arrangement | Primary customer | Ryanair announcement | No; single source | Medium | Not operational |
| E17 | Effective Chinese maintenance output | Jinwan's 100th PW1100G-JM redelivery; operations began 2025-03 | 2026-09-21 | Primary company | MTU Jinwan | No; single source | Medium | Not localization share |
| E18 | Gulf capability development | Emirates USD 300m expansion and GE piece-part repair technical/training agreement | 2026-05-14 | Primary customer | Emirates agreement | No; single source | Medium | Investment is not output |
| E19 | Regulatory boundaries | Applicable ADs must be checked for aircraft, engines and installed equipment; commercial need cannot replace compliance | Page updated 2025-01-21 | Regulatory | FAA AD applicability/compliance | Competent authority's text | High | None |
| E20 | Recent proposed rule | NPRM concerning certain P&W compressor issues; not an effective final AD | 2026-09-17 | Regulatory | Federal Register NPRM | Official regulatory publication | High | Proposed, not effective |
| E21 | Trade-media mechanism check | Older/newer generation shop visits coexist; technicians and parts matter; early numerical forecasts not adopted | Issue period 2025-12-22 to 2026-01-11 | Trade media | Aviation Week outlook | IATA/company evidence supports mechanisms, not independent financial verification | Medium | Early outlook |
| E22 | Open aftermarket agreement | Extended in 2026 through 2033-02; competitive maintenance supported; original signing year conflicts | 2026-01-20 | Industry body/agreement | IATA–CFM extension | No; single source | Medium | Yes: conflicts with E11 |
| E23 | Aircraft/engine boundary | Airbus delivered 547 aircraft in first 9 months; not directly convertible to engine deliveries including spares | First 9 months FY2026; 2026-10-28 | Primary financial | Airbus 9M | No; single source | Medium | Not engine statistics |
| E24 | Durability upgrades | LEAP-1B relevant upgrades certified; fleet realization needs observation; targets are not universal realized results | 2026-07-18 | Primary technical announcement | CFM certification | No; single source | Medium | Engine certification is not fleet-wide retrofit completion |
| E25 | US MRO investment | Pratt announced above USD 100m in US facilities; not actual incremental throughput | 2026-04-21 | Primary company | Pratt investment | No; single source | Medium | Plans/spending are not output |
10. References and source tiers
Tier one: primary financial and operating disclosures
Company annual reports, regulatory filings and formal earnings documents take priority: E01–E10 and E23. Investments, customer contracts and technical announcements verify operational actions: E03, E14–E18 and E24–E25. Official sources confirm disclosures, not the inevitable achievement of future targets. A company's release, presentation and media republication count as one source.
Tier two: industry research
IATA/Emerton (E11) supports engine-maintenance demand and constraints; IATA/Oliver Wyman (E12), airline cost estimates; Oliver Wyman (E13), fleet and maintenance mechanisms; and the IATA–CFM agreement (E22), aftermarket access. IATA represents airlines' interests and should be read alongside supplier disclosures. Advocacy is not a position-free consensus.
Tier three: professional media
Aviation Week (E21) adds cross-company maintenance and workforce context. It is not an independent audit of company finances. Early forecasts cannot override later actual results; repetition of the same number does not upgrade evidence to independent dual sourcing.
Tier four: regulatory documents
FAA applicability/compliance guidance (E19) and the proposed Federal Register AD (E20) establish safety and regulatory boundaries. Proposed provisions are distinguished from effective final requirements. The existence of a rule does not quantify commercial revenue.
All clickable sources appear individually in the evidence ledger. Conclusions remain revisable: when effective capacity, contractual obligations or independent evidence change, revise the verdict rather than preserve the story and merely replace its numbers.
All online sources were accessed on 2026-11-02. Data periods and publication dates follow the individual ledger entries; access dates do not substitute for data periods.